Initial curated Unraid-AppOps-Gateway source from 3bd6f6fee310125bfbb4d4650389a817f498724d

backend/app/schemas/deployment.py

@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+"""Strict, secret-free contracts for managed Unraid deployments.
+
+This module intentionally models a small deployment vocabulary.  It is not a
+Compose parser, a Docker API wrapper, or a generic remote-command interface.
+The controller derives filesystem paths and runtime arguments from this plan
+after it has accepted the immutable repository revision.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import posixpath
+import re
+from typing import Any, Literal
+
+import yaml
+from pydantic import (
+    BaseModel,
+    ConfigDict,
+    Field,
+    field_validator,
+    model_validator,
+)
+
+_APP_ID = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$")
+_REPOSITORY = re.compile(r"^jens/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]{0,96}$")
+_REVISION = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+_VERSION = re.compile(r"^v?(?:0|[1-9][0-9]*)(?:\.(?:0|[1-9][0-9]*)){2}(?:-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$")
+_NAME = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,62}$")
+_DOMAIN = re.compile(
+    r"^(?=.{1,253}$)(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z]{2,63}$"
+)
+_SECRET_REFERENCE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,120}$")
+_SAFE_PATH = re.compile(
+    r"^(?!/)(?!.*(?:^|/)\.\.(?:/|$))(?:[A-Za-z0-9]|\.[A-Za-z0-9])[A-Za-z0-9_./-]{0,239}$"
+)
+
+TRUSTED_APPCONFIG_ROOT = "/srv/example/appdata"
+
+
+class _StrictModel(BaseModel):
+    model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid", frozen=True, str_strip_whitespace=True)
+
+
+class DeploymentTopologyV1(_StrictModel):
+    """The only runtime shape accepted by V1.
+
+    V1 is deliberately compose-only and always private behind the existing
+    proxy network.  A public host binding, Docker socket or host networking is
+    outside this contract.
+    """
+
+    kind: Literal["compose"] = "compose"
+    compose_file: str = ".itworx/deployment.yml"
+    compose_project: str = Field(min_length=2, max_length=63)
+    containers: tuple[str, ...] = Field(min_length=1, max_length=8)
+    proxy_network: str = Field(min_length=2, max_length=63)
+    internal_port: int = Field(ge=1, le=65535)
+    restart_policy: Literal["unless-stopped"] = "unless-stopped"
+    build: RepositoryBuildV1 | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("compose_file")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_compose_file(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(value) or not value.endswith((".yml", ".yaml")):
+            raise ValueError("compose_file must be a safe repository-relative YAML path")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("compose_project", "proxy_network", "containers")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_runtime_name(cls, value: str | tuple[str, ...]) -> str | tuple[str, ...]:
+        values = value if isinstance(value, tuple) else (value,)
+        if any(not _NAME.fullmatch(item) for item in values):
+            raise ValueError("runtime names must use the bounded deployment identifier format")
+        if len(set(values)) != len(values):
+            raise ValueError("container names must be unique")
+        return value
+
+
+class RepositoryBuildV1(_StrictModel):
+    """A controller-revalidated repository build, never a caller shell step."""
+
+    context: str = "."
+    dockerfile: str = "Dockerfile"
+
+    @field_validator("context")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_context(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if value != "." and not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("build context must be a safe repository-relative path")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("dockerfile")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_dockerfile(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _SAFE_PATH.fullmatch(value) or not value.endswith("Dockerfile"):
+            raise ValueError("dockerfile must be a safe repository-relative Dockerfile path")
+        return value
+
+
+DeploymentTopologyV1.model_rebuild()
+
+
+class ProxyHostV1(_StrictModel):
+    hostname: str
+    certificate_mode: Literal["existing", "managed"] = "managed"
+    force_ssl: bool = True
+    http2: bool = True
+    upload_limit_mb: int = Field(default=256, ge=1, le=2048)
+    read_timeout_seconds: int = Field(default=180, ge=15, le=900)
+
+    @field_validator("hostname")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_hostname(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = value.lower().rstrip(".")
+        if not _DOMAIN.fullmatch(normalized) or normalized.startswith("-"):
+            raise ValueError("hostname must be a canonical DNS hostname")
+        return normalized
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def require_https_redirect(self) -> ProxyHostV1:
+        if not self.force_ssl:
+            raise ValueError("managed proxy hosts must force HTTPS")
+        return self
+
+
+class OidcRoleMappingV1(_StrictModel):
+    administrator_group: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    support_agent_group: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    read_only_group: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+
+    @field_validator("administrator_group", "support_agent_group", "read_only_group")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_group_name(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if any(character in value for character in "\r\n\x00"):
+            raise ValueError("role group names may not contain control characters")
+        return value
+
+
+class OidcProvisioningV1(_StrictModel):
+    provider: Literal["authentik"] = "authentik"
+    application_slug: str = Field(min_length=2, max_length=63)
+    redirect_path: str = "/signin-oidc"
+    role_claim: str = Field(default="groups", min_length=1, max_length=80)
+    client_secret_ref: str
+    roles: OidcRoleMappingV1
+
+    @field_validator("application_slug")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_application_slug(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _APP_ID.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("application_slug must be a bounded lower-case identifier")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("client_secret_ref")
+    @classmethod
+    def secret_reference_only(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _SECRET_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("client_secret_ref must reference a stored AppOps secret, never a value")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("redirect_path")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_redirect_path(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not value.startswith("/") or "//" in value or any(character in value for character in "?#\\\r\n"):
+            raise ValueError("redirect_path must be a relative HTTPS callback path")
+        return value
+
+
+class DeploymentPlanV1(_StrictModel):
+    """A validated, immutable deployment intent for one managed application."""
+
+    api_version: Literal["itworx.deployment/v1"] = "itworx.deployment/v1"
+    application_id: str
+    repository: str
+    revision: str
+    release_version: str
+    image_repository: str
+    image_tag: str
+    topology: DeploymentTopologyV1
+    proxy: ProxyHostV1 | None = None
+    oidc: OidcProvisioningV1 | None = None
+    health_path: str = "/healthz"
+    health_timeout_seconds: int = Field(default=180, ge=15, le=900)
+    broker_secret_ref: str
+    rollback_enabled: bool = True
+
+    @field_validator("application_id")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_app_id(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _APP_ID.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("application_id must be a bounded lower-case identifier")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("repository")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_repository(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = value.lower()
+        if not _REPOSITORY.fullmatch(normalized):
+            raise ValueError("repository must be a canonical Jens repository")
+        return normalized
+
+    @field_validator("revision")
+    @classmethod
+    def immutable_revision(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = value.lower()
+        if not _REVISION.fullmatch(normalized):
+            raise ValueError("revision must be a full lower-case 40-character Git SHA")
+        return normalized
+
+    @field_validator("release_version")
+    @classmethod
+    def semantic_version(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _VERSION.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("release_version must be a semantic version")
+        return value.removeprefix("v")
+
+    @field_validator("image_repository")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_image_repository(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        normalized = value.lower()
+        if not re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._/-]{1,180}", normalized):
+            raise ValueError("image_repository is not a safe image identifier")
+        return normalized
+
+    @field_validator("image_tag")
+    @classmethod
+    def immutable_image_tag(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if value.lower() == "latest" or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,127}", value):
+            raise ValueError("image_tag must be an explicit non-latest tag")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("broker_secret_ref")
+    @classmethod
+    def broker_secret_reference_only(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not _SECRET_REFERENCE.fullmatch(value):
+            raise ValueError("broker_secret_ref must reference a stored AppOps secret, never a value")
+        return value
+
+    @field_validator("health_path")
+    @classmethod
+    def safe_health_path(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        if not value.startswith("/") or "//" in value or any(character in value for character in "?#\\\r\n"):
+            raise ValueError("health_path must be a relative path")
+        return value
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def validate_cross_field_contract(self) -> DeploymentPlanV1:
+        if self.application_id not in self.topology.containers:
+            raise ValueError("application_id must be one of the managed container names")
+        if self.topology.compose_project != self.application_id:
+            raise ValueError("compose_project must equal application_id in DeploymentPlanV1")
+        if self.image_tag not in {self.release_version, self.revision[:12]}:
+            raise ValueError("image_tag must be the release version or immutable revision prefix")
+        if self.oidc and not self.proxy:
+            raise ValueError("OIDC provisioning requires a managed HTTPS proxy host")
+        return self
+
+    @property
+    def appdata_path(self) -> str:
+        return f"{TRUSTED_APPCONFIG_ROOT}/{self.application_id}"
+
+    @property
+    def public_url(self) -> str | None:
+        return f"https://{self.proxy.hostname}" if self.proxy else None
+
+
+def validate_compose_runtime_contract(plan: DeploymentPlanV1, raw_yaml: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate a repository compose artifact against the narrow V1 policy.
+
+    The result is suitable for evidence/audit storage and deliberately contains
+    no Compose environment values.  It rejects mounts, privileged flags and
+    runtime capabilities that would turn a product deployment into a host
+    control interface.
+    """
+
+    try:
+        document = yaml.safe_load(raw_yaml)
+    except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
+        raise ValueError("deployment compose YAML could not be parsed") from exc
+    if not isinstance(document, dict) or set(document) - {"services", "networks", "name"}:
+        raise ValueError("deployment compose only permits name, services and networks")
+    services = document.get("services")
+    if not isinstance(services, dict) or not services:
+        raise ValueError("deployment compose must define services")
+
+    expected = set(plan.topology.containers)
+    observed = set(services)
+    if observed != expected:
+        raise ValueError("deployment compose services must exactly match the typed plan containers")
+
+    for service_name, service in services.items():
+        if not isinstance(service, dict):
+            raise TypeError("deployment service must be an object")
+        forbidden = {
+            "privileged",
+            "devices",
+            "pid",
+            "ipc",
+            "cap_add",
+            "dockerfile",
+        }
+        present = forbidden.intersection(service)
+        if present:
+            raise ValueError(f"deployment service {service_name} uses forbidden runtime fields")
+        build = service.get("build")
+        if plan.topology.build is None:
+            if build:
+                raise ValueError("deployment service build is not declared by the typed plan")
+        else:
+            if isinstance(build, str):
+                observed_build = {"context": build, "dockerfile": "Dockerfile"}
+            elif isinstance(build, dict):
+                observed_build = {
+                    "context": str(build.get("context") or "."),
+                    "dockerfile": str(build.get("dockerfile") or "Dockerfile"),
+                }
+                if set(build) - {"context", "dockerfile"}:
+                    raise ValueError("deployment service build contains unsupported fields")
+            else:
+                raise ValueError("deployment service build must be declared by the typed plan")
+            expected_build = plan.topology.build.model_dump()
+            if observed_build != expected_build:
+                raise ValueError("deployment service build does not match the typed plan")
+        if service.get("network_mode") in {"host", "service:host"}:
+            raise ValueError("host networking is forbidden")
+        if service.get("ports"):
+            raise ValueError("published host ports are forbidden for managed proxy deployments")
+        security_options = service.get("security_opt") or []
+        if set(security_options) - {"no-new-privileges:true"}:
+            raise ValueError("deployment service uses unsupported security options")
+        if service.get("read_only") is not True:
+            raise ValueError("deployment services must use a read-only root filesystem")
+        if service.get("cap_drop") != ["ALL"]:
+            raise ValueError("deployment services must drop every Linux capability")
+        if service.get("restart") != "unless-stopped":
+            raise ValueError("deployment services must use restart: unless-stopped")
+        image = str(service.get("image") or "")
+        if image != f"{plan.image_repository}:{plan.image_tag}":
+            raise ValueError("deployment service image must equal the immutable plan image")
+        owned_bind_mounts = 0
+        for mount in service.get("volumes", []) or []:
+            if isinstance(mount, dict) and mount.get("type") not in {None, "bind"}:
+                raise ValueError("deployment services permit only application-owned bind mounts")
+            source = mount.get("source") if isinstance(mount, dict) else str(mount).split(":", 1)[0]
+            source_text = str(source or "")
+            normalized_source = posixpath.normpath(source_text)
+            if "docker.sock" in source_text:
+                raise ValueError("docker socket and host-control mounts are forbidden")
+            if (
+                not source_text.startswith("/")
+                or normalized_source != source_text
+                or source_text in {"/", "/proc", "/sys"}
+            ):
+                raise ValueError("only normalized application-owned bind mounts are permitted")
+            if source_text != plan.appdata_path and not source_text.startswith(plan.appdata_path + "/"):
+                raise ValueError("bind mounts must stay below the plan's owned appdata path")
+            owned_bind_mounts += 1
+        if not owned_bind_mounts:
+            raise ValueError("deployment services require an application-owned persistent bind mount")
+        networks = service.get("networks")
+        if networks != [plan.topology.proxy_network] and networks != {plan.topology.proxy_network: None}:
+            raise ValueError("deployment services must use only the typed proxy network")
+
+    networks = document.get("networks")
+    if networks != {plan.topology.proxy_network: {"external": True}}:
+        raise ValueError("deployment compose must reference exactly one existing proxy network")
+    return {
+        "services": sorted(observed),
+        "proxyNetwork": plan.topology.proxy_network,
+        "appdataPath": plan.appdata_path,
+        "image": f"{plan.image_repository}:{plan.image_tag}",
+    }