Initial curated ITWorx_MCP_Hub source from 368fba691ea8d23403b4d56b53b5ec670d7c5020
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# Security Test Plan
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## Identity
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- invalid signature, issuer, audience, expiry, not-before;
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- revoked client and disabled project;
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- dev token against prod alias;
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- user session fixation, CSRF, logout, refresh expiry;
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- duplicate and conflicting group/role bindings.
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## Router
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- unknown alias;
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- encoded path traversal;
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- oversized body;
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- hop-by-hop header injection;
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- attacker-supplied upstream host;
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- authorization header logging test;
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- timeout and partial-stream handling.
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## Connectors
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- path traversal and symlink escape;
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- SSRF and redirect to disallowed address;
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- output containing tokens, cookies, ANSI/control characters, and HTML;
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- target resource from another project;
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- pagination abuse and oversized output;
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- malicious document prompt injection retained as data only.
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## Docker broker
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- every write/exec endpoint absent;
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- raw API path denied;
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- unregistered container denied;
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- Docker label spoof resistance;
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- bounded logs;
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- socket unavailable degradation.
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## Persistence and audit
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- migration rollback/restore;
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- sanitized arguments;
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- audit cannot be modified through normal API;
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- retention job does not delete within protected window;
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- cache flush does not alter authorization truth.
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## Supply chain
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- lockfile integrity;
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- exact container digests in release manifest;
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- SBOM generated;
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- secret scan clean;
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- dependency and image scan policy enforced.
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## WP-160 executable gates
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`tests/test_wp160_security.py` covers prompt injection as data, secret-like content rejection, registered-root traversal, SSRF host literals, token-reference boundaries, gateway drift, Compose socket/public-port invariants, and SBOM contents. `scripts/security_scan.py` performs the deterministic source/Compose policy scan; `scripts/generate_sbom.py` emits a CycloneDX 1.5 inventory from locked Python/Node manifests and declared container images. Fixture-only findings are explicitly classified and do not become production evidence.
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